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Biometrics refer to identity verification of individuals based on some physiologic or behavioural characteristics. The typical
authentication process of a person consists in extracting a biometric pattern of him/her and matching it with the stored pattern
for the authorised user obtaining a similarity value between patterns. In this work an efficient method for persons authentication
is showed. The biometric pattern of the system is a set of feature points representing landmarks in the retinal vessel tree. The
pattern extraction and matching is described. Also, a deep analysis of similarity metrics performance is presented for the biometric
system. A database with samples of retina images from users on different moments of time is used, thus simulating a hard and real
environment of verification. Even in this scenario, the system allows to establish a wide confidence band for the metric threshold
where no errors are obtained for training and test sets.
Copyright © 2009 M. Ortega et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,
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1. Introduction
Reliable authentication of persons is a growing demanding
service in many fields, not only in police or military
environments but also in civilian applications, such as access
control or financial transactions. Traditional authentication
systems are based on knowledge (a password, a pin) or
possession (a card, a key). But these systems are not reliable
enough for many environments, due to their common
inability to differentiate between a true-authorised user
and a user who fraudulently acquired the privilege of the
authorised user. A solution to these problems has been
found in the biometric-based authentication technologies.
A biometric system is a pattern recognition system that
establishes the authenticity of a specific physiological or
behavioural characteristic. Authentication is usually used in
the form of verification (checking the validity of a claimed
identity) or identification (determination of an identity
from a database of known people, this is, determining who
a person is without knowledge of his/her name).
Many authentication technologies can be found in the
literature, some of them already implemented in com-
mercial authentication packages [1–3]. Other methods are
the fingerprint authentication [4, 5] (perhaps the oldest
of all the biometric techniques), hand geometry [6], face
[7, 8], or speech recognition [9]. Nowadays, the most
of the efforts in authentication systems tend to develop
more secure environments, where it is harder, or ideally
impossible, to create a copy of the properties used by the
system to discriminate between authorised and unauthorised
individuals. [10–12].
This paper proposes a biometric system for authentica-
tion that uses the retina blood vessel pattern. This is a unique
pattern in each individual and it is almost impossible to
forge that pattern in a false individual. Of course, the pattern
does not change through the individual’s life, unless a serious
pathology appears in the eye. Most common diseases like
diabetes do not change the pattern in a way that its topology
is affected. Some lesions (points or small regions) can
appear but they are easily avoided in the vessels extraction
method that will be discussed later. Thus, retinal vessel tree
pattern has been proved a valid biometric trait for personal
authentication as it is unique, time invariant and very hard
to forge, as showed by Mariño et al. [13, 14], who introduced
a novel authentication system based on this trait. In that
work, the whole arterial-venous tree structure was used as
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the feature pattern for individuals. The results showed a
high confidence band in the authentication process but the
database included only 6 individuals with 2 images for each
of them. One of the weak points of the proposed system
was the necessity of storing and handling a whole image as
the biometric pattern. This greatly facilitates the storing of
the pattern in databases and even in different devices with
memory restrictions like cards or mobile devices. In [15] a
pattern is defined using the optic disc as reference structure
and using multi scale analysis to compute a feature vector
around it. Good results were obtained using an artificial
scenario created by randomly rotating one image per user
for different users. The dataset size is 60 images, rotated 5
times each. The performance of the system is about a 99%
accuracy. However, the experimental results do not offer
error measures in a real-case scenario where different images
from the same individual are compared.
Based on the idea of fingerprint minutiae [4, 16], a
robust pattern was first introduced in [17] where a set of
landmarks (bifurcations and crossovers of retinal vessel tree)
were extracted and used as feature points. In this scenario,
the pattern matching problem is reduced to a point pattern
matching problem and the similarity metric has to be defined
in terms of matched points. A common problem in previous
approaches is that the optic disc is used as a reference
structure in the image. The detection of the optic disc is a
complex problem and in some individuals with eye diseases
this cannot be achieved correctly. In this work, the use of
reference structures is avoided to allow the system to cope
with a wider range of images and users.
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 a descrip-
tion of the authentication system is presented, specially the
feature points extraction and the matching stages. Section 3
deals with the analysis of some similarity metrics. Section 4
shows the effectiveness results obtained by the previously
described metrics running a test images set. Finally, Section 5
provides some discussion and conclusions.
2. Authentication System Process
In this work, the retinal vessel pattern for every person is
ultimately defined by a set of landmarks, or feature points,
in the vessel tree. For the system to perform properly, a
good representation of the retinal vessel tree is needed. The
extraction of the retinal vessel tree is explained in Section 2.1.
Next, the biometric pattern for an individual is obtained via
the feature points extracted from the vessel tree (Section 2.2).
The last stage in the authentication process is the matching
between the reference stored pattern for an individual and
the pattern from the acquired image (Section 2.3).
2.1. Retinal Vessel Tree Extraction. Following the idea that
vessels can be thought of as creases (ridges or valleys) when
images are seen as landscapes (Figure 1), curvature level
curves are employed to calculate the creases (crest and valley
lines).
Among the many definitions of a crease, the one based
on level set extrinsic curvature or LSEC, (1), has useful
Figure 1: Representation of a region in the image as a landscape.
Left side shows the retinal image with the region of interest marked
with a white rectangle. In the right side, the zoomed image over the
region of interest and the same region represented as a landscape,
showing the creaseness feature.
invariance properties. Given a function L : Rd → R, the level
set for a constant l consists of the set of points {x | L(x) = l}.
For 2D images, L can be considered as a topographic relief
or landscape and the level sets as its level curves. Negative
minima of the level curve curvature κ, level by level, form
valley curves, and positive maxima form ridge curves:
κ = (2LxLyLxy − L2yLxx − L2xLyy)(L2x + L2y)−3/2. (1)
However, the usual discretization of LSEC is ill-defined in
a number of cases, giving rise to unexpected discontinuities
at the centre of elongated objects. Due to this, theMLSEC-ST
operator, defined in [18, 19] for 3D landmark extraction of
CT and MRI volumes, is used. This alternative definition is
based on the divergence of the normalised vector field w:
κ = −div(w). (2)
Although (1) and (2) are equivalent in the continuous
domain, in the discrete domain, when the derivatives are
approximated by finite-centred differences of the Gaussian-
smoothed image, (2) provides much better results. The
creaseness measure κ is improved by prefiltering the image
gradient vector field using a Gaussian function.
Figure 2 shows the result of the creases extraction
algorithm for an input digital retinal image. Once the creases
image is calculated, the retinal vessel tree is extracted and
can be used as a valid biometric pattern. However, using
the whole creases image as biometric pattern has a major
problem in the codification and storage of the pattern as
we need to store and handle the whole image. To solve this,
similarly to the fingerprint minutiae, a set of landmarks is
extracted as the biometric pattern in the creases image. These
landmarks are representative enough for each individual
while consisting of a very reduced set of structures in the
retinal tree. In the next subsection, the extraction process of
this pattern is described.
2.2. Feature Points Extraction. The goal in this stage is to
obtain a robust and consistent biometric pattern easy to
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Figure 2: Example of digital retinal images showing the vessel tree. (a) Input retinal image. (b) Creases image from the input representing
the main vessels in the retina.
code and store. To perform this task, a set of landmarks
are extracted. The most prominent landmarks in retinal
vessel tree are crossovers (between two different vessels) and
bifurcation points (one vessel coming out of another one)
and they will be used in this work as the set of feature
points constituting the biometric pattern for characterising
individuals. Thus, the biometric pattern can be stored as a
set of feature points.
The creases image will be used to extract the landmarks,
as it is a good representation of the vessels in the retinal
tree as explained earlier. The landmarks of interest are points
where two different vessels are connected. Therefore, it is
necessary to study the existing relationships between vessels
in the image. The first step is to track and label the vessels to
be able to establish those relationships between them.
In Figure 3, it can be observed that creases images show
discontinuities in the crossovers and bifurcations points.
This occurs because of the two different vessels (valleys
or ridges) coming together into a region where the crease
direction cannot be set. Moreover, due to some illumination
or intensity loss issues, creases images can also show some
discontinuities along a vessel (Figure 3). This issue require a
process of joining segments to build the whole vessels prior
to the bifurcation/crossover analysis.
Once the relationships between segments are established,
a final stage will take place to remove some possible spurious
feature points. Thus, the four main stages in the feature
points extraction process are
(1) labelling of the vessels segments,
(2) establishing the joint or union relationships between
vessels,
(3) establishing crossover and bifurcation relationships
between vessels,
(4) filtering of the crossovers and bifurcations.
2.2.1. Tracking and Labelling of Vessel Segments. To detect
and label the vessel segments, an image-tracking process
is performed. As the creases images eliminate background
information, any nonnull pixel (intensity greater than zero)
belongs to a vessel segment. Taking this into account, each
row in the image is tracked (from top to bottom) and when a
Figure 3: Example of discontinuities in the creases of the retinal
vessels. Discontinuities in bifurcations and crossovers are due to
two creases with different directions joining in the same region.
Also, some other discontinuities along a vessel can happen due to
illumination and contrast variations in the image.
nonnull pixel is found, the segment tracking process takes
place. The aim is to label the vessel segment found, as a
line of 1 pixel width. That is, every pixel will have only two
neighbours (previous and next) avoiding ambiguity to track
the resulting segment in further processes.
To start the tracking process, the configuration of the 4
pixels which have not been analysed by the initially detected
pixel is calculated. This leads to 16 possible configurations
depending on whether there is a segment pixel or not in each
one of the 4 positions. If the initial pixel has no neighbours,
it is discarded and the image tracking continues. In the
other cases there are two main possibilities: either the initial
pixel is an endpoint for the segment, and this is tracked
in one way only or the initial pixel is a middle point and
the segment is tracked in two ways from it. Figure 4 shows
the 16 possible neighbourhood configurations and how the
tracking directions are established in any case.
Once the segment tracking process has started, in every
step a neighbour of the last pixel flagged as segment is
chosen to be the next. This choice is made using the
following criterion: the best neighbour is the one with
most nonflagged yet neighbours belonging to the segment.
This heuristic contains the idea of keeping the 1pixel width
segment to track along the middle of the crease (where
pixels have more segment pixels neighbours), keeping also
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Figure 4: Initial tracking process for a segment depending on the neighbours pixels surrounding the first pixel found for the new segment
in a 8-neighbourhood. As there are 4 neighbours not tracked yet (the bottom row and the one to the right), there are a total of 16 possible
configurations. Gray squares represent crease (vessel) pixels and white ones background pixels. The upper row neighbours and the left one
are ignored as they have already been tracked due to the image tracking direction. Arrows point to the next pixels to track while crosses flag
pixels to be ignored. In (d), (g), (j) and (n) the forked arrows mean that only the best of the pointed pixels (i.e., the one with more new
vessel pixels neighbours) is selected for continuing the tracking. Arrows starting with a black circle flag the central pixel as an endpoint for
the segment ((b), (c), (d), (e), (g), (i), (j)).
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Figure 5: Examples of union relationships. Some of the vessels
present discontinuities leading to different segments. These discon-
tinuities are detected in the union relationships detection process.
the original orientations in every step. When the whole
image tracking process finishes, every segment is a 1pixel-
width line with its endpoints defined. The endpoints are very
useful to establish relationships between segments as those
relationships can always be detected in the surroundings of
a segment endpoint. This avoids the analysis of every pixel
belonging to a vessel, considerably reducing the complexity
of the algorithm and, therefore, the running time. Finally,
to avoid some spurious segments or noise to appear, small
segments are removed using a length threshold.
2.2.2. Union Relationships. As stated before, unions detec-
tion is needed to build the vessels out of their segments.
Aside the segments from the creases image, no additional
information is required and therefore is the first kind
of relationship to be detected in the image. An union
or joint between two segments exists when one of the
segments is the continuation of the other in the same retinal
vessel. Figure 5 shows some examples of union relationships
between segments.
To find these relationships, the developed algorithm
uses the segment endpoints calculated and labelled in the
previous subsection. The main idea is to analyse pairs of
close endpoints from different segments and quantify the
likelihood of one being the prolongation of the other. The
proposed algorithm connects both endpoints and measures
the smoothness of the connection.
An efficient approach to connect the segments is using
a straight line between both endpoints. In Figure 6(a), a
graphical description of the detection process for an union is
showed. The smoothness measurement is obtained from the
angles between the straight line and the segment direction.
The segment direction is calculated by the endpoint direc-
tion. The maximum smoothness occurs when both angles
are π rad., that is, both segments are parallel and belong
to the straight line connecting it. The smoothness decreases
as both angles decrease. A criterion to accept the candidate
relationship must be established. A minimum angle θmin is
set as the threshold for both angles. This way, the criterion to
accept an union relationship is defined as
Union(r, s) = (α > θmin)∧ (β > θmin), (3)
where r, s are the segments involved in the union and α, β
their respective endpoints directions. It has been observed
that for values of θmin close to (3/4)π rad. the algorithm
delivers good results in all cases.
2.2.3. Bifurcation/Crossover Relationships. Bifurcations and
crossovers are the feature interest points in this work for
characterising individuals by a biometric pattern. A crossover
is an intersection between two segments. A bifurcation is a
point in a segment where another one starts from. While
unions allow to build the vessels, bifurcations allow to build
the vessel tree by establishing relationships between them.
Using both types the retinal vessel tree can be reconstructed
by joining all segments. An example of this is shown in
Figure 6(b).
A crossover can be seen in the segments image, as
two bifurcations between a segment and two others related
by an union. Therefore, finding bifurcation and crossover
relationships between segments can be reduced to find only
bifurcations. Crossovers can then be detected analysing close
bifurcations.
In order to find bifurcations in the image, an idea similar
to the union algorithm is followed: search the bifurcations
from the segments endpoints. The criterion in this case is
finding a segment close to an endpoint whose segment can
be assumed to start in the found one. This way, the algorithm
does not require to track the whole segments, bounding
complexity to the number of segments and not to their
length.
For every endpoint in the image, the process is as follows
(Figure 6(c)):
(1) compute the endpoint direction,
(2) extend the segment in that direction a fixed length
lmax,
(3) analyse the points in and nearby the prolongation
segment to find candidate segments,
(4) if a point of a different segment is found, compute the
angle (α) associated to that bifurcation, defined by
the direction of this point and the extreme direction
from step 1.
To avoid undefined prolongation of the segments, a new
parameter lmax is inserted in the model. If it follows that
l ≤ lmax, the segments will be joined and a bifurcation will
be detected, being l the distance from the endpoint of the
segment to the other segment.
Figure 7 shows one example of results after this stage.
Feature points are marked. Also, spurious detected points are
identified in the image. These spurious points may occur for
different reasons such as wrongly detected segments. In the
image test set used (over 100 images) the approximate mean
number of feature points detected per image was 28. The
mean of spurious points corresponded to 5 points per image.
To improve the performance of the matching process is
convenient to eliminate as spurious points as possible. Thus,
the last stage in the biometric pattern extraction process
will be the filtering of spurious points in order to obtain an
accurate biometric pattern for an individual.
















Figure 6: (a) Union of creases segments r and s. The angles between the new segment AB and the creases segments r (α) and s (β) are near
π rad. so they are above the required threshold ((3/4)π) and the union is finally accepted. (b) Retinal Vessel Tree reconstruction by unions
(t,u) and bifurcations (r, s) and (r, t). (c) Bifurcation between segment r and s. The endpoint of r is prolonged a maximum distance lmax and
eventually a point of segment s is found.
(a) (b)
Figure 7: Example of feature points extracted from original image after the bifurcation/crossover stage. (a) Original Image. (b) Feature
points marked over the segment image. Spurious points are signalled. Circles surrounding spurious points due to false segments extracted
from the image borders and squares surrounding pairs of points corresponding to the same crossover (detected as two bifurcations).
2.2.4. Filtering of Feature Points. As showed in Figure 7(b),
the highest feature point detected comes from a bifurcation
involving an spurious segment. This segment appears in the
creases extraction stage as this algorithm can make some false
creases to appear in the image borders.
To avoid these situations, feature points very close to
image borders are removed as the vast majority of them
correspond to bifurcations involving false segments. A
minimum distance to the border threshold of approximately
3% of the width/height of the image is enough to avoid these
false features.
A segment filtering process takes place in the tracking
stage, filtering detected segments by their length. This leads
to images with minimum false segments and with only
important segments in the vessel tree.
Finally, as crossover points are detected as two bifurca-
tion points, Figure 7(b), these are merged into an unique
feature point.
Figure 8 shows an example of the filtering process result,
that is, the biometric pattern obtained from an individual.
In resume, the average of 5 spurious points per image
was reduced to 2 per image after the filtering process.
These points are derived from bad extracted regions in the
creases stage. The removal of non spurious points with this
technique is almost null (around 0.2 points per image in the
average).
2.3. Biometric Pattern Matching. In the matching stage,
the stored reference pattern, ν, for the claimed identity is
compared to the pattern extracted, ν′, during the previous
stage. Due to the eye movement during the image acquisition
stage, it is necessary to align β with α in order to be matched
[20–22]. This fact is illustrated in Figure 9 where two images
from the same individual, Figures 9(a) and 9(c), and the
obtained results in each case, Figures 9(b) and 9(d), are
showed.
Depending on several factors, such as the eye location
in the objective, patterns may suffer some deformations. A
reliable and efficient model is necessary to deal with these
deformations allowing to transform the candidate pattern
in order to get a pattern similar to the reference one.
The movement of the eye in the image acquisition process
basically consists in translation in both axis, rotation and
sometimes a very small change in scale. It is also important
to note that both patterns ν and ν′ could have a different
number of points as seen in Figure 9 where, from the same
individual, two patterns are extracted with 24 and 19 points.
This is due to the different conditions of illumination and
orientation in the image acquisition stage.
The transformation considered in this work is the
similarity transformation (ST), which is a special case of
the global affine transformation (GAT). ST can model
translation, rotation and isotropic scaling using 4 parameters
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Figure 8: Example of the result after the feature points filtering. (a) Image containing feature points before filtering. (b) Image containing
feature points after filtering. Spurious points from image borders and duplicate crossover points have been eliminated.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 9: Examples of feature points obtained from images of the same individual acquired in different times. (a) (c) Original images. (b)
Feature points image from (a). A total of 24 points are obtained. (d) Feature points image from (c). A total of 19 points are obtained.
[23]. The ST works fine with this kind of images as the
rotation angle is moderate. It has also been observed that
the scaling, due to eye proximity to the camera, is nearly
constant for all the images. Also, the rotations are very slight
as the eye orientation when facing the camera is very similar.
Under these circumstances, the ST model appears to be very
suitable.
The ultimate goal is to achieve a final value indicating
the similarity between the two feature points set, in order to
decide about the acceptance or the rejection of the hypothesis
that both images correspond to the same individual. To
develop this task the matching pairings between both images
must be determined. A transformation has to be applied to
the candidate image in order to register its feature points with
respect to the corresponding points in the reference image.
The set of possible transformations is built based on some
restrictions and a matching process is performed for each one
of these. The transformation with the highest matching score
will be accepted as the best transformation.
To obtain the four parameters of a concrete ST, two
pairs of feature points between the reference and candidate
patterns are considered. If M is the total number of feature
points in the reference pattern and N the total number of
points in the candidate one, the size of the set T of possible





where M and N represent the cardinality of ν and ν′,
respectively.
Since T represents a high number of transformations,
some restrictions must be applied in order to reduce it. As
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the scale factor between patterns is always very small in this
acquisition process, a constraint can be set to the pairs of
points to be associated. In this scenario, the distance between
both points in each pattern has to be very similar. As it
cannot be assumed that it will be the same, two thresholds
are defined, Smin and Smax, to bound the scale factor. This
way, elements from T are removed where the scale factor is
greater or lower than the respective thresholds Smin and Smax.





where p, q are points from ν pattern, and p′, q′ are the
matched points from the ν pattern. Using this technique,
the number of possible matches greatly decrease and, in
consequence, the set of possible transformations decreases
accordingly. The mean percentage of not considered trans-
formations by these restrictions is around 70%.
In order to check feature points, a similarity value
between points (SIM) is defined which indicates how similar
two points are. The distance between these two points will
be used to compute that value. For two points A and B, their
similarity value is defined by
SIM(A,B) = 1− distance(A,B)
Dmax
, (6)
where Dmax is a threshold that stands for the maximum
distance allowed for those points to be considered a possible
match. If distance(A,B) > Dmax, then SIM(A,B) = 0. Dmax
is a threshold introduced in order to consider the quality
loss and discontinuities during the creases extraction process
leading to mislocation of feature points by some pixels.
In some cases, two points B1, B2 could have both a
good value of similarity with one point A in the reference
pattern. This happens because B1 and B2 are close to each
other in the candidate pattern. To identify the most suitable
matching pair, the possibility of correspondence is defined
comparing the similarity value between those points to the











An M × N matrix Q is constructed such that position
(i, j) holds P(Ai,Bj). Note that if the similarity value is 0,
the possibility value is also 0. This means that only valid
matchings will have a non-zero value in Q. The desired set C
of matching feature points is obtained from P using a greedy
algorithm. The element (i, j) inserted in C is the position in
Q where the maximum value is stored. Then, to prevent the
selection of the same point in one of the images again, the
row (i) and the column( j) associated to that pair are set to 0.
The algorithm finishes when no more non-zero elements can
be selected from Q.
The final set of matched points between patterns is
C. Using this information, a similarity metric must be
established to obtain a final criterion of comparison between
patterns. Performance of several metrics using matched
points information is analysed in Section 3.
3. Similarity Metrics Analysis
The goal in this stage of the process is to define similarity
measures on the aligned patterns to correctly classify authen-
tications in both classes: attacks (unauthorised accesses),
when the two matched patterns are from different individuals
and clients (authorised accesses) when both patterns belong
to the same person.
For the metric analysis, a set of 150 images (100 images,
2 images per individual, and 50 different images more) from
VARIA database [24] were used. The rest of the images will be
used for testing in Section 4. The images from the database
have been acquired with a TopCon nonmydriatic camera
NW-100 model and are optic disc centred with a resolution
of 768 × 584. There are 60 individuals with two or more
images acquired in a time span of 6 years. These images have
a high variability in contrast and illumination allowing the
system to be tested in quite hard conditions. In order to
build the training set of matchings, all images are matched
versus all the images (a total of 150 × 150 matchings) for
each metric. The matchings are classified into attacks or
clients accesses depending if the images belong to the same
individual or not. Distributions of similarity values for both
classes are compared in order to analyse the classification
capabilities of the metrics.
The main information to measure similarity between two
patterns is the number of feature points successfully matched
between them. Figure 10(a) shows the histogram of matched
points for both classes of authentications in the training
set. As it can be observed, matched points information is
by itself quite significative but insufficient to completely
separate both populations as in the interval [10, 13] there is
overlapping between them.
This overlapping is caused by the variability of the
patterns size in the training set because of the different
illumination and contrast conditions in the acquisition stage.
Figure 10(b) shows the histogram for the biometric pattern
size, that is, the number of feature points detected. A high
variability can be observed, as some patterns have more than
twice the number of feature points of other patterns. As a
result of this, some patterns have a small size, capping the
possible number of matched points (Figure 11). Also, using
the matched points information alone lacks a well bounded
and normalised metric space.
To combine information of patterns size and normalise
the metric, a function f will be used. Normalised metrics
are very common as they make easier to compare class sep-
arability or establishing valid thresholds [25]. The similarity
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Figure 10: (a) Matched points histogram in the attacks (unauthorised) and clients (authorised) authentications cases. In the interval [10, 13]
both distributions overlap. (b) histogram of detected points for the patterns extracted from the training set.
(a) (b)
Figure 11: Example of matching between two samples from the same individual in VARIA database. White circles mark the matched points
between both images while crosses mark the unmatched points. In (b) the illumination conditions of the image lead to miss some features
from left region of the image. Therefore, a small amount of detected feature points is obtained capping the total amount of matched points.
where C is the number of matched points between patterns,
and M and N are the matching patterns sizes. The first f
function defined and tested is:
f (M,N) = min(M,N). (9)
The min function is the less conservative one as it
allows to obtain a maximum similarity even in cases of
different sized patterns. Figure 12(a) shows the distributions
of similarity scores for clients and attacks classes in the
training set using the normalisation function defined in (9),
and Figure 12(b) shows the FAR and FRR curves versus the
decision threshold.
Although the results are good when using the normalisa-
tion function defined in (9), a few cases of attacks show high
similarity values, overlapping with the clients class. This is
caused by matchings involving patterns with a low number of
feature points as min(M,N) will be very small, needing only
a few points to match in order to get a high similarity value.
This suggests, as it will be reviewed in Section 4, that some
minimum quality constraint in terms of detected points
would improve performance for this metric.
To improve the class separability, a new normalisation




Figure 13(a) shows the distributions of similarity scores
for clients and attacks classes in the training set using the
normalisation function defined in (10) and Figure 13(b)
shows the FAR and FRR curves versus the decision threshold.
Function defined in (10) combines both pattern sizes in
a more conservative way, preventing the system to obtain a
high similarity value if one pattern in the matching process
contains a low number of points. This allows to reduce the
attacks class variability and, moreover, to separate its values
away from the clients class as this class remains in a similar
values range. As a result of the new attacks class boundaries,



















































Figure 12: (a) Similarity values distribution for authorised and unauthorised accesses using f = min(M,N) as normalisation function for
the metric. (b) False accept rate (FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR) for the same metric.
a decision threshold can be safely established where FAR =
FRR = 0 in the interval [0.38, 0.5] as Figure 13(b) clearly
exposes. Although this metric shows good results, it also
has some issues due to the normalisation process which
can be corrected to improve the results as showed in next
subsection.
3.1. Confidence Band Improvement. Normalising the metric
has the side effect of reducing the similarity between patterns
of the same individual where one of them had a much greater
number of points than the other, even in cases with a high
number of matched points. This means that some cases easily
distinguishable based on the number of matched points are
now near the confidence band borders. To take a closer look
at this region surrounding the confidence band, the cases of
unauthorised accesses with the highest similarity values (S)
and authorised accesses with the lowest ones are evaluated.
Figure 14 shows the histogram of matched points for cases
in the marked region of Figure 13(b). It can be observed
that there is an overlapping but both histograms are highly
distinguishable.
To correct this situation, the influence of the number of
matched points and the patterns size have to be balanced.
A correction parameter (γ) is introduced in the similarity
measure to control this. The new metric is defined as





with S, C, M, and N the same parameters from (10). The γ
correction parameter allows to improve the similarity values
when a high number of matched points is obtained, specially
in cases of patterns with a high number of points.
Using the gamma parameter, values can be higher than
1. In order to normalise the metric back into a [0, 1] values




where s is a scale factor to adjust the function to the correct
domain as Sγ does not return negatives or much higher than
1 values when a typical γ ∈ [1, 2] is used. In this work, s =
6 was chosen empirically. The normalised gamma-corrected
metric, S′γ(x), is defined by
S′γ = T(Sγ). (13)
Finally, to choose a good γ parameter, the confidence
band improvement has been evaluated for different values of
γ (Figure 15(a)). The maximum improvement is achieved at
γ = 1.12 with a confidence band of 0.3288, much higher than
the original from previous section. The distribution of the
whole training set (using γ = 1.12) is showed in Figure 15(b)
where the wide separation between classes can be observed.
4. Results
A set of 90 images, 83 different from the training set, and
7 from the previous set with the highest number of points,
has been built in order to test the metrics performance once
their parameters have been fixed with the training set. To
test the metrics performance, the false acceptance rate and
false rejection rate were calculated for each of them (the
metrics normalised by (9), (10) and the gamma-corrected
normalised metric defined in (13).
A usual error measure is the equal error rate (EER) that
indicates the error rate where FAR curve and FRR curve

















































Figure 13: (a) Similarity values distribution for authorised and unauthorised accesses using f = √MN as normalisation function for the
metric. (b) False accept rate (FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR) for the same metric. Dotted lines delimit the interest zone surrounding the



























Figure 14: Histogram of matched points in the populations of
attacks whose similarity is higher than 0.3 and clients accesses whose
similarity is lower than 0.6.
intersect. Figure 16(a) shows the FAR and FRR curves for
the three previously specified metrics. The EER is 0 for
the normalised by geometrical mean (mean) and gamma
corrected (gamma) metrics as it was the same case in the
training set, and, again, the gamma corrected metric shows
the highest confidence band in the test set 0.2337.
The establishment of a wide confidence band is specially
important in this scenario of different images from users
acquired on different times and with different configurations
of the capture hardware.
Finally, to evaluate the influence of the image quality,
in terms of feature points detected per image, a test is run
where images with a biometric pattern size below a threshold
are removed for the set and the confidence band obtained
with the rest of the images is evaluated. Figure 16(b) shows
the evolution of the confidence band versus the minimum
detected points constraint. The confidence band does not
grow significatively until a fairly high threshold is set. Taking
as threshold the mean value of detected points for all the test
set, 25.2, the confidence band grows from 0.2337 to 0.3317.
So removing half of the images, the band is increased only
by 0.098 suggesting that the gamma-corrected metric is very
robust to low quality images.
The mean execution time on a 2.4 Ghz. Intel Core Duo
desktop PC for the authentication process, implemented in
C++, was 155 milliseconds: 105 milliseconds in the feature
extraction stage and 50 milliseconds in the registration and
similarity measure estimation, so that the method is very well
fitted to be employed in a real verification system.
5. Conclusions and FutureWork
In this work, a complete identity verification method has
been introduced. Following the same idea as the fingerprint
minutiae-based methods, a set of feature points is extracted
from digital retinal images. This unique pattern will allow
for the reliable authentication of authorised users. To get the
set of feature points, a creases-based extraction algorithm
is used. After that, a recursive algorithm gets the point
features by tracking the creases from the localised optic
disc. Finally, a registration process is necessary in order










































Figure 15: (a) Confidence band size versus gamma (γ) parameter value. Maximum band is obtained at γ = 1.12. (b) Similarity values














































Figure 16: (a) FAR and FRR curves for the normalised similarity metrics (min: normalised by minimum points, mean: normalised by
geometrical mean, and gamma: gamma corrected metric). The best confidence band is the one belonging to the gamma corrected metric
corresponding to 0.2337.(b) Evolution of the confidence band using a threshold of minimum detected points per pattern.
to match the reference pattern from the database and the
acquired one. With the patterns aligned, it is possible to
measure the degree of similarity by means of a similarity
metric. Normalised metrics have been defined and analysed
in order to test the classification capabilities of the system.
The results are very good and prove that the defined
authentication process is suitable and reliable for the task.
The use of feature points to characterise individuals is a
robust biometric pattern allowing to define metrics that offer
a good confidence band even in unconstrained environments
when the image quality variance can be very high in terms of
distortion, illumination, or definition. This is also possible
as this methodology does not rely on the localisation or
segmentation of some reference structures, as it might be
the optic disc. Thus, if the the user suffers some structure-
distorting pathology and this structure cannot be detected,
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the system works the same with the only problem being a
possible loss of feature points constrained to that region.
Future work includes the use of some high-level infor-
mation of points to complement metrics performance and
new ways of codification of the biometric pattern allowing to
perform faster matches.
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